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Abstract
The role of migrants’ networks in promoting cross border investments
has been stressed in the literature, possibly making migration and FDI
complements rather than substitutes in the long run. In this paper, we
estimate the magnitude of such business network externalities in dynamic
empirical models of FDI-funded capital accumulation. We use original
data on capital and migration stocks rather than ‡ows. Regarding mi-
grants, we distinguish the total and the skilled diasporas abroad. In both
cross-sectional and panel frameworks, we …nd evidence of strong network
externalities, mainly associated to the skilled diaspora. These network
externalities are stronger for countries exhibiting intermediate corruption
index.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
For the last decades, the pace of international migration has accelerated. Ac-
cording to the United Nations, the number of international migrants increased
from 75 to about 200 million between 1960 and 2005. An increasing proportion
of them is concentrated in high-income countries. The phenomenon is likely
to further develop in the coming decades given the rising gap in wages and
the di¤ering demographic futures in developed and developing countries. The
consequences of emigration for countries of origin have attracted the increased
attention of policymakers, scientists and international agencies.
Many observers have emphasized the bene…ts from unskilled migration and
the costs of skilled migration for developing countries. However, alongside the
direct impact on the labor market, migrants generate multiple feedback e¤ects
on their origin countries. An important channel concerns remittances. The
recent Global Economic Prospects (World Bank, 2006) stress the substantial
welfare gains for migrants’ families. O¢cially recorded remittances worldwide
exceeded $232 billion in 2005, twice the level of international aid. About 72 per-
cent of this goes to developing countries. In addition, recent models in the brain
drain literature emphasize the bene…cial e¤ects of skilled migration prospects
on education enrollment and the bene…ts associated to return migration (after
additional skills and knowledge have been acquired abroad)1. This literature
shows that the global impact of skilled migration on human capital is ambigu-
ous.
Network or diaspora externalities constitute an additional channel through
which migration a¤ects source countries. By creating trust, providing market
information and reducing transaction costs, the diaspora abroad acts as pro-
moting trade, investment and technology adoption in the origin country. The
purpose of our paper is to evaluate the magnitude of these ”business network”
externalities on foreign direct investment (FDI). In a global context, FDI in‡ows
constitute a major source of capital accumulation and technology di¤usion in
1See Stark et al (1997, 1998), Mountford (1999), Beine et al (2001, 2003), Stark and Wang
(2002).
2developing countries. As suggested by various sectoral studies, the diaspora im-
pact is likely to be linked to the presence of skilled migrants abroad. As a result,
a bene…cial brain drain can be obtained, even when depressing the average level
of schooling in the emigration country.
Using an original data set on emigration stocks by educational attainment
and FDI-funded capital stock, we empirically evaluate the relationship between
FDI, the size and the educational structure of the diaspora. Our empirical study
has three important characteristics:
² First, it relies on two original sources of data. Regarding FDI, we use a
classical inventory method to evaluate the FDI-funded stock of capital per
worker in a large number of countries. As FDI ‡ows are very volatile and
can hardly be interpreted in the long-run (long-run equilibria are usually
de…ned in terms of stocks), working on stock data is much better than
working on ‡ows. Regarding migration, we distinguish skilled and un-
skilled migrants and, contrary to previous studies, we also use migration
stocks instead of ‡ows. We rely on a new comprehensive and consistent
data set on international migration by educational attainment, that de-
scribes the loss of skilled workers to the OECD for all countries in 1990
and 2000 (see Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Our analysis of business
network is the …rst that distinguishes the role of migrants’ education.
² Second, we compare cross-section and panel elasticities. Our analysis is
guided by the availability of migration data. As migration stocks are only
evaluated for 1990 and 2000, our core empirical model describes the change
in the FDI-funded capital stock between 1990 and 2000. Such a cross-
section regression raises multiple problems of endogeneity and omitted
variables. In a second stage, we use an extended and simpli…ed version of
the migration data set2 and test for the network e¤ect in a panel regression
with 4 observations by country. Although many controls are not available
on a large period, the panel results con…rm the existence of strong diaspora
2See Defoort (2006).
3e¤ects of similar intensity.
² Finally, instead of relying on bilateral data, our analysis is based on the
aggregate stock of FDI-funded capital received by the world countries.
Several reasons motivate our choice. Bilateral FDI data are only available
for limited pairs of countries or for limited periods. Considering aggre-
gate FDI in‡ows allows computing the total stock of capital and save us
modeling the competition and/or coordination between foreign investors.
In addition, since international migrants are strongly concentrated in one
or two OECD countries, our analysis can be viewed as bilateral analysis
between all the world countries and their main OECD partners.
We …nd evidence of important network externalities. Our analysis con…rms
that business networks are mostly driven by skilled migration. The elasticity
of the FDI-funded capital growth rate to skilled migration is between 2 and 3
percent. Hence, the size of the diaspora matters. The recent literature on the
brain drain reveals the human capital response to skilled migration is likely to be
positive in large countries characterized by low rates of migration. This paper
brings an additional channel through which large countries may bene…t from
skilled migration: having a large educated diaspora abroad stimulates physical
capital accumulation. On the other hand, small countries are less likely to
bene…t from skilled migration. Finally, we show that diaspora externalities are
stronger in countries where corruption is not too high and not too low.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 gives a brief
overview of the literature on network. Section 3 describes the simple framework
we use to derive a dynamic equation of capital accumulation. Data are presented
in Section 4. Cross-section results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 gives the
panel estimates. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses possible extensions.
2 Brief literature review
Diaspora externalities have long been recognized in the sociological literature
and, more recently, by economists in the …eld of international trade. In many
4instances indeed, and contrarily to what one would expect in a standard trade
theoretic framework, trade and migration appear to be complements rather
than substitutes thanks to the participation of migrants to trade networks that
reduce transaction and other types of information costs3. The same ’transaction
cost’ argument holds for the relationship between migration and FDI. To the
extent that skilled migrants participate in business networks that contribute to
reduce transaction costs between the host and home countries, skilled migration
will encourage future FDI ‡ows, which will foster activity and welfare in the
emigration country.
Rauch (2003) explains the importance of networks/diasporas as conduits for
trade, investment and technology transfer from North America and Europe to
the less developed world. Also IOM (International Organization for Migration)
stresses the importance of diaspora contributions within FDI and Trade. For
example, it is estimated that 50 to 70 percent of FDI in China originated in the
Chinese diaspora. The importance of Chinese networks is con…rmed for instance
by Gao (2003) and Tong (2003).
Why would diasporas be important in promoting international trade and
investments? Rauch (2003) stresses two major channels through which the di-
aspora could promote international trade and investments . First, it creates
(or substitutes for) trust in a weak international legal environment. Co-ethnic
networks provide community enforcement of sanctions to deter opportunism
and violations of contracts. If a party acts opportunistically, then its reputa-
tion would su¤er within that network. Second, the diaspora provides market
information or supplies matching and referral services. Co-ethnic networks can
promote trade because they are familiar with the market needs in their country
of origin. They can provide important information to foreign investors, which
may otherwise be di¢cult or costly to obtain. In addition, they reduce com-
munication barriers: migrants know the language, the culture, the values, the
law and the practices of their home country. They know the way of thinking of
3See for example Gould (1994), Lopez and Schi¤ (1998), Rauch and Trindade (2002),
Rauch and Casella (2003), Wagner, Head and Ries (2002).
5their compatriots and they better understand who is well to trust or not to trust
being more aware of potential business partners. The channels just described
seem to apply mainly to skilled migrants, as it is con…rmed by various sectoral
case-studies, notably in the case of the software industry (Saxenian, 1999, 2001,
Arora and Gambardella, 2004).
A few empirical studies aimed at measuring the magnitude of the diaspora
externality. In his study on the role of ethnic Chinese networks in attracting
FDI, Gao (2003) considered both the population share of ethnic Chinese and
the log of the absolute population of ethnic Chinese in the source country.
In a gravity model framework, Tong (2003) studied the role of ethnic Chinese
in promoting bilateral investments by using the product of the numbers of ethnic
Chinese in pairs of countries in 1990.
Focusing on the mechanisms trough which NAFTA-related variables might
work to reduce migration to the US, Aroca and Maloney (2004) used data on
migration ‡ows from and within Mexico without distinguishing between skilled
and unskilled migrants. They found that both FDI and trade variables are
substitutes for labor ‡ows (FDI and trade reduce migration).
In another study on Germany, Buch, Kleiner and Toubal (2003) used data
on inward and outward migration of Germans and foreigners. As they could not
have information on the stocks of Germans living abroad or on foreigners living
in Germany, they computed gross and net stocks of migrants in order to obtain
proxies for the community of Germans living abroad and of foreigners living
in Germany, respectively. They …nd that FDI are complements to migration:
there is a relatively strong link between the stocks of German migrants and the
stocks of German FDI abroad. For the immigration of the foreigners and FDI
in‡ows, the evidence is weaker. They tested also for causality: they found that
with regard to outward FDI and emigration of Germans, the causality seems
to run from migration to FDI; with regard to FDI in‡ows and immigration of
foreigners, the causality seems to run from FDI to migration.
Only in a more recent study Kugler and Rapoport (2005) combined US
Census data on immigration stocks by country of origin and education level for
61990 and 2000 with data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis on FDI
out‡ows by destination country and sector. They model the relationships of
substitutability or complementarity between migration (by skill level) and the
sectoral composition of FDI. They …nd that skilled migration and FDI in‡ows
are negatively correlated contemporaneously but past skilled migration is asso-
ciated with an increase in current FDI in‡ows. Moreover, they …nd evidence
of substitutability between current migration and FDI for migrants with sec-
ondary education and of complementarity between past migration and FDI for
unskilled migrants.
3 What should be tested?
In a couple of papers, Razin et al. (2005a,b) develop a stylized neo classical
model to explain FDI bilateral ‡ows between countries. Introducing setup …xed
costs, they explain why zero reported ‡ows can be observed between pairs of
countries. Here, focusing on aggregate FDI (rather than bilateral ‡ows), we con-
sider a similar stylized model abstracting from setup …xed costs but accounting
for risk premium and informational costs. These costs are assumed to be de-
creasing in the size of the emigration network, especially the skilled diaspora
abroad. Testable implications can be derived from this simple framework.
Let us consider a small open economy characterized by a production function
à la Barro, Mankiw and Sala-I-Martin (1995):
Yi;t = Ai;tF(Ki;t;H i;t;N i;t) (1)
where Ai;t determines the total factor productivity, Ki;t is the stock of capital,
Hi;t is the stock of human capital, Ni;t is the size of the labor force and F(:) is
the production function, homogenous of degree one (constant returns to scale).
As capital is mobile across countries, the optimal marginal productivity of
capital is equal to the international interest rates r¤
t augmented of a country-







t + ¼i;t = ½i;t
7Since F0
K is homogenous of degree zero, the …rst order condition determines
the optimal quantity of capital per worker, k¤





i;tNi;t = ·(Ai;t;h i;t;½ i;t)Ni;t
where hi;t is the country-wide average level of human capital and · is the inverse
function of F
0
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½ < 0.
For many reasons (imperfect information about the determinants of the op-
timal capital stock, transaction and adjustment costs, time to build private
infrastructure, etc.), adjusting the capital stock to its optimal value is not an
instantaneous process. For simplicity, we consider that capital adjustments fol-






Taking logs and working in units of labor, we have:
lnki;t =( 1¡ ¯)lnki;t¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)lnmi;t + ¯ lnk¤
i;t
where mi;t is one plus the growth rate of the labor force.




= ¯ ln·(Ai;t;h i;t;½ i;t) ¡ ¯ lnki;t¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)lnmi;t (3)
Several elements determining the optimal level of capital are endogenous:
² Network e¤ects in‡uence the country-risk premium. Denoting by Mi;t
the total number of migrants and by hM
i;t the share of high-skill among
migrants, we can write
½i;t = ½(Mi;t;h M
i;t;Riski;t);
where Riski;t is an indicator of economic and political climate that can
be captured by the democracy index, the corruption perception index,
political instability, etc.
8² The total factor productivity is likely to depend on human capital (accord-
ing to the Schumpeterian model of technology di¤usion), lagged physical
capital per worker (under learning by doing), the population size and
growth rate (due to increasing returns) and variables capturing the eco-
nomic and political climate:
Ai;t = A(hi;t¡1;k i;t¡1;N i;t;m i;t;Riski;t);
² The average level of schooling could also be treated as endogenous.





= a0 + a1:lnki;t¡1 + a2:hi;t + a3:lnmi;t + a4:lnNi;t (4)
+a5:lnMi;t + a6:hM
i;t + a7:Riski;t + a8:Xi;t + ²i;t
where
² a0 is a constant;
² a1 captures the convergence speed towards the optimal amount of capital
per worker: we expect a negative e¤ect (a1 = ¡¯);
² a2 captures the e¤ect of human capital on capital accumulation: the e¤ect
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the proportion of high-skill workers has
a positive e¤ect on labor productivity. On the other hand, it is more and
more usual to relocate part of the production process in countries endowed
in unskilled labor when the cost of labor is low;
² a3 and a4 capture the dilution e¤ect of population growth and size as well
as the market size. We expect dilution e¤ect to play negatively on capital
per worker: since capital adjustments take time, a rise in the labor force
has a negative impact on capital per worker in the short-run. However, a
large labor force or a high population growth rate induces an increasing
market size which is more attractive for investments;
9² a5 measures the intensity of the migration business network. We expect a
positive sign if network e¤ects are signi…cant;
² a6 determines the importance of high-skill workers in determining the
business network externality. We expect a positive estimate;
² a7 controls for the political environment;
² a8 is a vector of parameters associated to a set of addition controls Xi;t,
² ²i;t is the residual.
In Section 5, this empirical model will be applied to data on the FDI-funded
stock of capital. In Section 6, we will use a panel regression model.
Are migration and FDI substitutes or complements? From equation (4),
the general impact of migration on capital accumulation is quite di¢cult to
evaluate. Using Ki;t = ki;t:Ni;t,we have:
lnKi;t = a0 +( 1+a1):(lnKi;t¡1 ¡ lnNi;t¡1)+a2:hi;t + a3:lnmi;t
+(1 + a4):lnNi;t + a5:lnMi;t + a6:hM
i;t + a7:Riski;t + a8:Xi;t
Obviously, a new migrant (leaving her country between t¡1 and t) induces
a one-for-one decrease in Ni;t and a one-for-one increase in Mi;t. Older migrants
(who left before t ¡ 1) impacted on Ni;t¡1 a n di nt u r no nKi;t¡1.M i g r a t i o n
also a¤ects the structure of the labor force (hi;t), the education structure of the
network (hM
i;t)a n dt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h el a b o rf o r c e( mi;t). Therefore, deriving
the global impact of contemporaneous migration on capital is a complex task.
Hence, we will not address the issue of global substitutability or complementarity
between migration and FDI. Our purpose will only be to check for the existence
of network e¤ects in capital accumulation and to examine whether such diaspora
relationships are skill biased.
4 Data issues
In this section, we describe the data used to test the relationship between the
diaspora size and the foreign capital stock in activity. In particular, we describe
10how we have built measures for the capital stock per worker (FDI-funded or
total) and for the network size (by educational attainment).
Capital stock data. Data on foreign direct investments and the gross
formation of physical capital are taken from the World Development Indicators.
Regarding FDI, this data set gives the total in‡ows by country, abstracting
from the origin of the in‡ows and the type of FDI. Hence, our analysis will
focus on the diaspora impact on aggregate FDI in‡ows rather than on bilateral
exchanges. In addition, we will not distinguish between vertical FDI that aim
at relocating a part of the activity, and horizontal FDI that aim at launching a
good on a new market.4
Data on FDI and total investments are mainly available from the late 1970’s
(about 100 observations in 1975 for both variables) and are available for about
150 countries in the recent years. Tables 1 and 2 give a broad pictures of
the data. We compute the average growth rate of FDI and the share of FDI
in total investment by income group, by region of particular interest and by
level of corruption. Regarding corruption, we distinguish four groups of equal
size according to the quartiles of the distribution. The …rst group is made of
countries whose corruption index is less than or equal to 2.4; the second group
by countries with a level comprised between 2.4 and 3.3; the third one with a
level comprised between 3.3 and 5.8, the fourth, the less corrupted one, with a
level higher than 5.8.
Table 1 compares the average annual growth rate of FDI and total invest-
ments evaluated in constant 1995 $US between 1980 and 2000. With globaliza-
tion, the growth rate of FDI have been much stronger than the growth rate of
total investments in the last twenty years, except in the early nineties. Strong
disparities can be observed across groups of countries. High growth rates are
observed in high-income, OECD countries, comforting the fact that economic
activity tends to concentrate where initial productivity if high, i.e. where human
c a p i t a li sh i g ho rw h e r et h en u m b e ro f… r m si sl a r g e .H o w e v e r ,a sm a n ys t a g e s
of the production process can be relocated in countries where the cost of labor
4For a more precise de…nition see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004
11is low and as new markets are emerging all around the world, other less devel-
oped countries have also bene…ted from large investments. FDI grew rapidly
in low-income countries in the early eighties and nineties, especially in Asian
countries. Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries also exhibit high growth
rates in the early nineties. It is also worth noticing that FDI growth rates have
been stronger in less corrupted, especially in the early stages of globalization.
12Tab 1. Average annual growth rate of FDI and total investment
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000
Total 0.8% 4.8% 0.5% 3.2% 4.3% 19.1% -1.1% 27.1%
By income group
High Income Countries 1.2% 4.7% 0.6% 3.7% 4.6% 19.9% -3.9% 29.5%
Upper-Middle Income Countries -4.8% 7.3% 5.5% 2.4% 0.8% 6.8% 16.4% 16.8%
Lower-Middle Income Countries 0.2% 1.9% -10.9% -3.1% 1.5% 8.4% 16.6% 9.2%
Low Income Countries 4.4% 4.9% 8.7% 3.1% 10.7% 15.1% 44.6% 2.8%
By Region
Mena 3.0% -3.8% 1.1% 1.2% 7.0% 8.3% 8.2% 9.9%
Sub-Saharan Countries -2.8% 1.1% 1.9% 0.6% -5.3% 3.3% 20.6% -2.0%
East Asia 1.6% 7.0% 0.6% 1.0% 18.7% 27.3% -6.2% 23.9%
South East Asia 4.0% 8.8% 7.7% -5.1% -0.7% 24.3% 6.0% 6.0%
Other Asia 3.8% 7.2% 0.5% 3.1% 10.1% 15.9% 7.9% 8.4%
Latin America -7.5% 4.0% 7.3% 3.0% -4.4% 3.9% 22.8% 17.7%
OECD Countries  1.0% 4.8% 0.5% 3.9% 4.7% 19.8% -3.8% 28.3%
By  Corruption Index Level
1 level -1.2% 1.5% -4.5% -3.3% -6.7% 19.1% 15.8% 10.6%
2 level -0.6% 5.0% -8.7% 1.5% -9.6% 11.2% 17.1% 11.3%
3 level -2.2% 4.1% 4.3% 3.0% 6.5% 3.8% 20.1% 10.2%
4 level 1.5% 5.0% 0.9% 3.5% 4.3% 20.3% -3.6% 29.6%
By size
Large ad Upper Middle Countries 0.9% 4.9% 0.5% 3.2% 2.7% 20.7% -1.9% 25.2%
Small and Lower Middle Countries -0.5% 4.4% -0.1% 3.4% 22.3% 11.5% 3.4% 35.4%
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2003). Own calculations.
Growth rate of total investment (1995 US$, average 
per year)
Growth rate of gross FDI (1995 US$, average per 
year)
Table 2 gives a broad picture of the share of FDI in the gross formation of
physical capital. This proportion indicates whether or not globalization a¤ected
the ownership of capital all around the world. On the whole sample, the share
of FDI increased from 5.4 percent in 1980 to 39.3 percent 2000. Remarkable
increases were observed between 1995 and 2000 and to a lesser extent, between
1985 and 1990. The largest changes are obtained for high-income OECD coun-
tries. Nevertheless, important relative changes are also observed in South-East
Asia, East Asia, Latin America. A remarkable fact is that changes in the FDI
proportion vary with country size (usually capturing the degree of openness):
small countries have experienced a drastic increase in FDI over the last years.
13Tab 2. Share of FDI in total investment (selected years)
1980 1984 1985 1989 1990 1994 1995 2000
Total 5.4% 6.4% 6.0% 11.3% 10.8% 10.0% 11.3% 39.3%
By income group
High Income Countries 5.8% 6.9% 6.4% 12.7% 13.1% 10.5% 12.0% 45.7%
Upper-Middle Income Countries 4.5% 5.6% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 6.9% 8.6% 19.0%
Lower-Middle Income Countries 2.1% 2.3% 4.0% 5.5% 1.5% 5.6% 6.3% 13.0%
Low Income Countries 0.9% 1.2% 1.9% 3.0% 2.8% 11.7% 10.8% 10.7%
By Region
Mena 7.3% 8.8% 4.0% 7.3% 6.8% 9.5% 9.5% 15.6%
Sub-Saharan Countries 1.9% 1.7% 6.3% 7.0% 5.1% 11.9% 13.9% 11.9%
East Asia 0.8% 1.8% 2.0% 4.7% 5.0% 3.5% 3.6% 12.2%
South East Asia 7.0% 5.5% 5.7% 11.1% 14.5% 13.4% 11.7% 22.7%
Other Asia 5.0% 6.7% 2.0% 2.9% 2.6% 3.7% 5.3% 7.2%
Latin America 3.8% 4.5% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 8.7% 9.9% 22.0%
OECD Countries  5.7% 6.8% 6.4% 12.5% 12.7% 10.3% 12.0% 42.6%
By  Corruption Index Level
1 level 1.5% 1.2% 2.4% 5.4% 2.5% 6.5% 7.6% 16.9%
2 level 2.9% 1.8% 2.9% 3.9% 1.2% 4.1% 5.4% 9.4%
3 level 3.0% 4.6% 3.8% 3.7% 4.7% 9.6% 10.3% 15.5%
4 level 6.0% 6.9% 6.6% 13.0% 13.2% 10.6% 12.0% 46.2%
By size
Large ad Upper Middle Countries 5.6% 6.1% 5.2% 10.5% 10.1% 8.9% 10.4% 33.1%
Small and Lower Middle Countries 3.3% 9.1% 14.4% 19.9% 19.3% 22.9% 21.8% 99.7%
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2003). Own calculations.
As investment ‡ows are extremely volatile and cannot capture the long-run
trends of nations (in the long-run, ‡ows just compensate for depreciation and
demographic growth), our analysis is based on stock data. Obviously, there is no
data set providing series of capital stock (af o r t i o r i , FDI-funded capital stock)
by country. We thus use investment data to construct capital stock series for
114 countries in 1990 and 2000. We distinguish the FDI-funded capital stock
and the total capital stock. We use a classical inventory method based on the
standard equation of capital accumulation:
Ki;t = Ki;t¡1(1 ¡ d)+Ii;t¡1
where d is the depreciation rate (…xed at 4 percent a year) and Ii;t¡1 is the
amount of FDI or total investment alternatively.




14where Ii;75¡80 is the growth-corrected average amount of investment between
1975 and 1980.
We then apply the capital accumulation function sequentially to compute
annual stocks from 1980 to 2000 . Series of capital per worker ki;t are obtained
by dividing the capital stock by the labor force, measured as the population
aged 25 and more in the country.
M i g r a t i o na n dh u m a nc a p i t a ld a t a . Data on the population aged 25
and more (proxy of the labor force) are provided by the United Nations. The
labor force is splitted across educational group using international human capital
indicators. Three levels of schooling are distinguished:
² low-skill workers are those with primary education (0 to 8 years of school-
ing completed),
² medium skilled workers are those with secondary education (9 to 12 years
of schooling),
² high-skilled workers are those with tertiary education (13 years and above).
Several sources are combined. Following Docquier and Marfouk (2006), we
use De la Fuente and Domenech for OECD countries and Barro and Lee (2000)
data for other countries. For countries where Barro and Lee measures are miss-
ing, we use Cohen and Soto’s available indicators (2001) or we transpose the
skill sharing of the neighboring country with the closest rate of enrollment in ed-
ucation. Hence, data on the labor force by educational attainment are available
for all the world countries.
Regarding migration, our analysis builds on a new comprehensive and con-
sistent data set on international migration by educational attainment (see Doc-
quier and Marfouk, 2006). This data set describes the loss of skilled workers
to the OECD for all countries in 1990 and 2000. They distinguish the same
educational groups as in the human capital data above. Emigration stocks by
educational attainment are computed for every country of the world. These
15stocks are obtained by aggregating consistent immigration data collected in re-
ceiving countries. Docquier and Marfouk count as migrants all working-aged
(25 and over) foreign born individuals living in an OECD country. Considering
the working-aged population (aged 25 and over) maximizes the comparability of
the immigration population with data on educational attainment in the source
countries. It also excludes a large number of students who temporarily emi-
grate to complete their education. By restricting the set of receiving countries
to the OECD area, they focus on the South-North and North-North brain drain.
Although a brain drain can be observed outside the OECD area (to the Gulf
countries, South Africa, Malaysia, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, etc.), they
estimate that about 90 percent of high-skill international migrants are living
OECD countries. Data are available for all the world countries. They measure
the size of the diaspora residing in the OECD, by educational attainment.
These data can be used for the cross-section analysis of the determinants
of FDI. For extended panel regressions, we use the estimates provided in De-
foort (2006). Focusing on the six major destination countries (USA, Canada,
Australia, Germany, UK and France), they have computed skilled emigration
stocks and rates from 1975 to 2000 (one observation every 5 years). On the
whole, the six destination countries represent about 75 percent of the OECD
total immigration stock. However, for some origin countries, the coverage is
quite low. For example, Surinamese emigrants mainly live in the Netherlands.
About 3 percent of Surinamese emigrants live in the six major receiving coun-
tries. The panel analysis is then based on much reliable econometric techniques,
but less reliable data.
Other data. As for FDI and total investments, the world development
indicators provide many information about other country characteristics such
as population size and growth, level of income.
Data on corruption are taken from the Transparency International data set.
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is a composite index re‡ecting the per-
ceptions of business people, country analysts, both resident and non-resident.
It draws on 16 di¤erent polls from 10 independent institutions. The CPI score
16relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as and ranges between 10 (non
corrupted country) and 0 (highly corrupted country). A number of countries -
including some which could be among the most corrupt - are missing because
not enough survey data is available. To maximize the number of observation and
reduce to risk of selection bias, we use the 2004 CPI scores which are available
for 146 countries. The highest scores (around 9.5) are obtained in Scandinavian
countries, New Zealand, Iceland, Singapore The worst scores are obtained in
Haiti and Bangladesh (1.5), Nigeria (1.6), Burma and Chad (1.7), Paraguay
(1.9).
Data on political regime are taken from the POLITY IV data set. The in-
dicator of democracy ranges from 0 in dictatorial regimes to 1 in democratic
regimes. It measures the general openness of political institutions and combines
variables such as the regulation of Executive Recruitment (institutionalized pro-
cedures regarding the transfer of executive power), the competitiveness of ex-
ecutive recruitment (extent to which executives are chosen through competitive
elections), the openness of executive recruitment (opportunity for non-elites to
attain executive o¢ce), executive constraints (operational independence of chief
executives), the regulation of participation: development of institutional struc-
tures for political expression) and the competitiveness of participation (extent
to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political ex-
pression). The worst scores (0) are obtained in Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba,
Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan.
5 Empirical analysis
Our general ¯-convergence model is given by (4) in which ki;t measures the
FDI-funded capital stock per worker in country i at time t. The dependent
variable is the average annual real growth rate of ki;t between 1990 and 2000.
Building on (4), we introduce a set of controls Xi;t which were shown to in-
‡uence investment decision in existing empirical studies. As argued by Barba
Navaretti and Venables (2004), ”explanatory variables can be a vector of …rm
17and/or industry characteristics, of home country characteristics, of host country
characteristics and of bilateral relationships between home and host countries,
such as the distance between them. Choice of variable to use depends partly on
the hypothesis being investigated and partly on data availability”.
To avoid serious multicollinearity problems, we do not incorporate all poten-
tial controls simultaneously. We compare several regressions and try to end up
with the most reasonable model in which only signi…cant variables are kept. In
these regressions, we will consider the corruption index, the democracy index,
the distance with two important industrialized regions (the USA and the EU15)
as well as international trade.
Geographical distance can be used as a proxy for trade costs (Gao, 2003).
Trade costs can have opposite implications for the pattern of FDI. Vertical FDI
are negatively a¤ected by distances as they involve trade. Horizontal FDI are
likely to increase with distances (one of the main reason of horizontal FDI is
to serve foreign markets minimizing trade costs). Usually geographical distance
is considered as one of the most important obstacles to FDI, meaning that (i)
there could be a dominance of vertical FDI, but also that (ii) setup …xed costs
involved by horizontal FDI can be positively correlated with distance (Markusen
and Venables, 2000). The recent literature also assimilates greater geographic
distance to greater ’cultural’ distance and thus larger communication and infor-
mation costs (Butch et al., 2005). In this sense, greater distance could have a
direct (negative) e¤ect on both vertical and horizontal FDI.
Similarly, the degree of trade openness has an ambiguous impact on FDI, de-
pending if the type of investment. In the case of horizontal FDI, more openness
induces less investments. In the case of vertical FDI, the opposite correlation is
expected. Considering the importance of vertical investment towards develop-
ing countries that occurs from the 1990’s onward, we include as a measure of
trade openness the log of the trade (imports + exports) with OECD countries in
percentage of the 1990 GDP. However more trade could not only be an indicator
of vertical FDI, but also an indicator of openess (related to the country size),
competitiveness and therefore attractiveness of the country. Open economies
18are likely to be more attractive for FDI since transnational corporations can
r e a pe c o n o m i e so fs c a l ea n ds c o p e ,e v e ni nc o u n t r i e sw h e r et h em a r k e ts i z ei s
small. That could be one of the reasons why in the latest years developing
countries increased their participation in regional integration scheme.
We will also introduce a dummy variable to underline that high income
countries are more attractive for capital investments.
General model. Table 3 gives the results for our general speci…cation. Five
alternative models are distinguished. Since heteroskedasticity can be important
across countries, the standard errors for the coe¢cients are based on White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.
Tab 3. Cross-section - general speci…cation
Dependent variable = Growth rate of FDI-funded capital stock per worker
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
logfdi90pc -0.040 -0.040 -0.042 -0.042 -0.041
(3.58)*** (4.23)*** (4.15)*** (4.21)*** (4.06)***
dlogpop -0.064 -0.016 -0.005 -0.043 -0.022
 (0.37)   (0.09)   (0.02)   (0.24)  (0.12)
logMSTOT90 0.021 0.013 0.015 0.017  - 
(1.90)* (2.04)** (2.11)** (2.51)**  - 
SHM90 0.207 0.179 0.291 0.174  - 
(2.27)** (2.10)** (2.58)** (2.04)**  - 
logMSHIGH90  -   -   -   -  0.019
 -   -   -   -  (2.52)**
HIGHincome 0.097 0.083 0.031 0.090 0.088
(2.77)*** (2.16)**  (-0.68)  (2.33)** (2.29)**
logPAC90 -0.008  -   -   -   - 
 (0.66)   -   -   -   - 
DemocracyIndex  -  0.077 0.115 0.082 0.077
 -  (1.72)* (2.41)** (1.95)* (1.74)*
logtrade  -   -  0.036 0.034 0.036
 -   -  (2.07)** (2.13)** (2.27)**
logdistUSA  -   -  -0.011  - 
 -   -  (0.48)  -   - 
logdistEU15  -   -  -0.040  -   - 
 -   -   (1.55)   -   - 
Constant 0.162 0.076 0.344 -0.040 0.013
 (0.88)   (0.63)   (1.06)   (0.34)  (0.13)
Observations 114 113 96 109 109
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.53 0.52
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
19The main results can be summarized as follows:
Convergence speed. In every speci…cation, the estimated coe¢cient of the
lagged dependent is highly signi…cant and very stable. We …nd a convergence
speed of about 4 percent per year.
Market size. A potentially important determinant of FDI is the market
size. Since our dependent variable is capital per worker, the size of the market
is neutralized on the left hand-side. Anyway, under increasing returns (which
can be related to …xed setup costs), the market size may positively a¤ect the
capital stock per worker. In model 1, we control for the log of the working-aged
population in 1990 as a proxy to the market size. This variable is not signi…cant.
Similar results were obtained with log of the total population (regression not
reported). We did not consider the log of the GDP because of endogeneity
problems. There is no evidence of additional market size e¤ect on the right hand-
side. The estimated coe¢cient of the growth rate of the labor force is negative
(as expected) but statistically not signi…cant. In separate regressions, to avoid
multicollinearity problems, we ran regressions considering the rate of growth of
the labor force by skill level: in all cases, this variable is never signi…cant.
Structure of the labor force. The structure of the labor force is potentially
important in predicting FDI in‡ows. As argued in section 2, the proportion of
high-skill workers has a positive e¤ect on labor productivity. Nevertheless, part
of the production process in countries endowed in unskilled labor when the cost
of labor is low. We obtain evidence that the average level of schooling has a
positive e¤ect on FDI in‡ows. However, including the share of high-skill workers
causes serious problems of stability given the strong multicollinearity with many
variables such as the lagged capital stock per worker. By adding a dummy for
high-income countries, we capture the strong attractiveness of human capital.
The coe¢cients are very stable across samples and speci…cations. The coe¢cient
for this dummy is positive and generally signi…cant.
Country openness. As trade costs and various types of trade barriers are
crucial in explaining the pattern of FDI, we introduce the distance with the
most important countries and trade in model 3. The estimated coe¢cients for
20distance are negative, but statistically not signi…cant. This can be due to the
fact that our study focuses on total FDI in‡ows rather than on bilateral ex-
changes. On the contrary, the estimated coe¢cient of trade openness is positive
and statistically signi…cant.
Political climate. In models 2 to 5, we control for democracy as a potential
determinant. The estimated coe¢cient is positive (between 0.077 and 0.115) and
statistically signi…cant at 5 or 10 percent. This measure serves as our proxy for
the domestic investment environment, assuming that a stable macroeconomic
environment generates more investment. In separate regressions, we considered
also a variable measuring the size of the informal market (component of the
corruption index). The estimated coe¢cient was negative sign but it was never
signi…cant. Similarly, political instability coe¢cients were not statistically sig-
ni…cant. Another important candidate is the corruption index. Nevertheless,
as with human capital indicators, perception corruption index induce serious
problems of multicollinearity and stability of the model. The corruption index
is highly correlated with the high income dummy (0.8225) and with the lagged
dependent capital stock per worker (0.5745). For this reason, we will come back
to corruption below.
Network e¤ects. The estimated coe¢cients of the log of the stock of total
expatriates and of the share of high skilled migrants are always positive and
highly signi…cant. The migration stock is the only signi…cant variable capturing
the size of the country. However, given the discussion about the market size, we
have strong reasons to believe that such an e¤ect is related to diaspora rather
than to market size. For example, in model 1, we consider both the size of the
labor force and the stock of expatriates. We obtain a positive diaspora e¤ect
despite a strong correlation (0.68 ) between the network size and the labor force
(which turns out to be insigni…cant). In further regressions, by excluding the
labor force and reducing the risk of multicollinearity, the diaspora e¤ect becomes
very signi…cant. Model 4 is our …nest speci…cation with all our statistically
signi…cant variables. The elasticity of capital per worker to migration amounts
to 1.7 percent. A 10 percentage point rise in the number of migrants increases
21the growth rate of capital per worker by 1.74 percent. The proportion of skilled
migrants is also an important factor of business externality. Our results reveal
that business networks are mostly driven by skilled migration. In model 5, we
impose diaspora e¤ect to transit through skilled workers and obtain a 2 percent
elasticity of capital growth to migration.
In the rest of this section, we start from our best speci…cations (models 4 and
5) and allow for non linear e¤ects. We examine whether the intensity of diaspora
externalities varies with the level of corruption and compares the impacts on
FDI-funded capital and on the total capital stock per worker.
Business networks and corruption. In the general speci…cation, we ex-
clude corruption for multicollinearity and stability reasons. Let us now examine
whether corruption a¤ects the size of diaspora e¤ects. The literature stresses
the importance of networks both in weak and strong international legal envi-
ronment (i.e. corrupted and not corrupted countries). While a good investment
climate is likely to be more attractive for FDI, ethnic networks are more likely to
be crucial in weak environment, where information costs are higher and where
community enforcement of sanctions are important. In countries with clean
institutions, the role of ethnic networks consists in limiting information costs.
To capture the relationship between networking and the level of corruption,
we classify countries according to their perception corruption index. As in Tables
2 and 3, the minimal value is 1.5 for the most corrupted countries and 9.7 for
the less one. We distinguish four country groups of equal size according to the
quartiles of the distribution. The …rst group is made up by countries whose
corruption index is less than 2.4; the second group by countries with a level
comprised between 2.4 and 3.3; the third one with a level comprised between
3.3 and 5.8, the fourth, the less corrupted one, with a level higher than 5.8.
We create four dummies, one for each group, and then generate four interaction
terms by multiplying the log of the total number of the expatriates (or the log
of high skilled migrants) by each dummy. These variables are used as predictors
in the regressions.
Table 4 gives the results. Models 1 and 2 are based on the total number
22of expatriates and abstract from the skill structure of migrants (to avoid mul-
ticollinearity problems); models 3 and 4 are based on the number of skilled
expatriates.
Tab 4. Cross-section - diaspora e¤ect by level of corruption
Dependent variable = Growth rate of FDI-funded capital stock per worker
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
logfdi90pc -0.040 -0.039 -0.041 -0.04
(3.61)*** (3.55)*** (3.81)*** (3.81)***
dlogpop -0.070 -0.108 -0.042 -0.073
(0.37)  (0.54)  (0.35) (0.35)
logMSTOT90IP1 0.011 0.012  - 
(1.69)* (1.79)*  -   - 
logMSTOT90IP2 0.013 0.015  -   - 
(2.01)** (2.29)**  -   - 
logMSTOT90IP3 0.014 0.017  -   - 
(2.21)** (2.60)**  -   - 
logMSTOT90IP4 0.011 0.014  -   - 
 (1.55)  (2.07)**  -   - 
logMSHIGH90IP1  -   -  0.016 0.016
 -   -  (2.00)** (2.11)**
logMSHIGH90IP2  -   -  0.019 0.021
 -   -  (2.27)** (2.58)**
logMSHIGH90IP3  -   -  0.020 0.022
 -   -  (2.59)** (3.00)***
logMSHIGH90IP4  -   -  0.018 0.021
 -   -  (2.08)** (2.57)**
Democracy Index 0.080  -  0.066 -
(1.88)*  -  (1.56)* -
logtrade 0.032 0.029 0.032 0.030
(2.25)** (1.94)* (2.33)** (2.07)**
HIGHincome 0.099 0.104 0.088 0.092
(2.54)** (2.77)*** (2.30)** (2.49)**
 Constant 0.077 0.109 0.042 0.071
(0.78)  (1.04)  (0.39) (0.62)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.52
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All other things being equal, does corruption a¤ect the diaspora externality?
Considering the total number of expatriates, the estimate for the most corrupted
countries is 0.011 with a signi…cance level of 10 percent; for the second and
third groups, we have respectively 0.013 and 0.014 with a signi…cance level of
5 percent; in the less corrupted countries, the estimated coe¢cient is positive
(0.011), but statistically insigni…cant. The latter result deserves an econometric
23extension. In model 1, the VIF (variance in‡ation factor) for the four group is
14.61. Usually 10 is the tolerated value. A value greater than 10 can re‡ect
multicollinearity problems and in‡ated standard errors. As democracy index is
correlated to corruption and comes out to be the less signi…cant variable in the
regression (signi…cant at 10%), we estimate model 2 by excluding this variable.
Then, the estimated coe¢cient for the less corrupted countries becomes positive
and signi…cant at 5% and the VIF has a tolerated value. Anyway, the coe¢cients
indicate that network e¤ects are stronger in countries exhibiting an intermediate
corruption index.
Considering the number of skilled expatriates, all the coe¢cients are positive
and statistically signi…cant at 5 percent. This result holds with or without
controlling for democracy. We obtain the same pro…le than in models 1 and
2. Networks e¤ects play a minor role into the most corrupted countries. The
major e¤ect is obtained for the third and the second groups characterized by
intermediate corruption levels. We conclude that corruption induces a inverted
U-shape impact on networking. Diaspora externalities seems to play a major
role in community enforcement of sanction, at least when the country is not too
corrupted. On the contrary the role played by ethnic networks is in providing
information is weaker (although highly signi…cant) if the level of corruption is
very low.
Business network and total investment. For the matter of comparison,
we apply our general ¯-convergence model (4) to the total stock of physical
capital per worker (an alternative measure of ki;t) rather than to the FDI-
funded capital stock per worker. Such an analysis allows us to con…rm the
existence of diaspora e¤ect at the global level (the FDI-funded capital stock is a
component of the total capital stock) or to highlight some compensating e¤ect
due, for example, to an joint increase in FDI in‡ows and out‡ows.
Basically, we use the same speci…cations as in table 3. Table 5 describes the
results.
24Tab 5. Cross-section - general speci…cation
Dependent variable = Growth rate of the total capital stock per worker
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
logkl90 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(2.38)** (2.58)** (2.41)** (2.30)**
dlogpop -0.088 -0.072 -0.084 -0.081
(3.41)*** (2.52)** (2.80)*** (2.70)***
logMSTOT90 0.008 0.006 0.008  - 
(2.60)** (1.87)* (2.64)***  - 
SHM90   0.072 0.063 0.055  - 
(3.04)*** (2.38)** (1.91)*  - 
logMSHIGH90  -   -   -  0.009
 -   -   -  (2.62)**
HIGHincome 0.029 0.024 0.022 0.021
(2.12)**  (1.52)   (1.4)  (1.35)
logPAC90 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(2.68)*** (1.76)*  (1.45)  (1.34)
Democracy Index  -  0.034 0.032 0.033
 -  (2.49)** (2.87)*** (3.01)***
logtrade  -   -  0.010 0.011
 -   -  (2.21)** (2.40)**
Constant 0.196 0.178 0.134 0.151
(2.97)*** (2.65)***  (1.60)  (1.64)
Observations 103 101 95 95
R-squared 0.36 0.41 0.50 0.48
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Four interesting results are emerging.
Lower convergence speed. A …rst remarkable result is that we obtain a much
slower convergence speed (1.7 percent a year instead of 4 percent) for the total
capital stock. Over the period 1990-2000, it seems that FDI movements have
been much more rapid than local investments. This can be explained either by
the general trend of increasing exchanges between countries (globalization) or
by stronger imperfections in capital adjustment.
Imperfections matter. Although globalization is an undeniable phenomenon
a¤ecting the openness of the world countries, imperfections on the local market
for capital seem to be stronger. Indeed, the growth rate of the population has
a negative e¤ect the growth rate of capital per worker, indicating that the total
stock of capital adjusts more slowly to demographic changes. We did not …nd
evidence of such an e¤ect with FDI-funded capital.
25Less sensitivity to trade and political regime. We also note that the impact
of the democracy index and of trade are also divided by 3 compared to table
3. The total stock of capital per workers is less sensitive to the economic and
political environment.
Smaller diaspora externality. Finally, the network e¤ects are smaller al-
though signi…cant. Compared to table 3, the estimates are divided by 3. This
can re‡ect (i) the fact that the FDI-funded capital stock remains a small fraction
of the total capital stock, or (ii) a general tendency towards increased special-
ization and exchanges between countries. In‡ows can be partly compensated by
out‡ows.
6 Panel data analysis
In a cross-section setting, the standard ordinary least square estimator with
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors reveals a 2 percent elasticity of the
growth rate of the FDI-funded capital stock per worker to the stock of skilled
emigrants. These cross-section results can be biased and inconsistent given the
dynamic nature of the growth equation. In order to obtain more accurate results,
we extend our analysis in a panel setting using a more sophisticated econometric
method which take into account the possible endogeneity of explanatory vari-
ables and omitted variables. As mentionned above, the quality of the panel data
on migration is lower on a large time period. Our objective is to con…rm the
existence of business newtork externalities when a robust econometric technique
is applied.
T h e r ei sal a r g ed e b a t ea b o u tt h em o s ta c c u r a t em e t h o d o l o g yt oe s t i m a t e
growth equations (see Islam, 1993, 2003, Caselli et alt, 1996, Barghava and
Sargan, 1983, Bhargava et al, 2003). Here, we use a GMM system estimator
for dynamic panel data model. This technique exploits both the cross-sectional
and the time dimension of the data. It accounts for unobserved …xed e¤ects. It
controls for the potential endogeneity of all the explanatory variables and allows
for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
26Econometric methodology. Let us brie‡y present the technique used.
Consider the simpli…ed version of the regression equation (4) in which all ex-






= a0 + a1:ln(ki;t¡1)+¯
0
Xi;t + ´i + "i;t
where Xit represents the set of the explanatory variables other than the lagged
dependent, ´i represents the unobserved country-speci…c …xed e¤ect, "it is the
error term.
This equation can be re-written in the standard dynamic panel form
ln(ki;t)=a0 +( 1+a1):ln(ki;t¡1)+¯
0
Xi;t + ´i + "i;t (5)
A general approach to estimate such an equation is to use a transforma-
tion that removes unobserved e¤ects and that uses for instrumental variables.
Anderson and Hsiao (1992) propose to work with …rst di¤erences and then to
search for instruments. They proposed for the lagged dependent either the two
period lagged di¤erence or the two period lagged level of the dependent vari-
able. A generalization of that method was proposed by Arellano-Bond (1991).
They suggest using the entire set of instruments in a GMM procedure to reach
signi…cant e¢ciency gains.
Di¤erentiating (5) yields
ln(ki;t) ¡ ln(ki;t¡1)=( 1 + a1):[ln(ki;t¡1) ¡ ln(ki;t¡2)]
+¯
0
(Xit ¡ Xit¡1)+( "it ¡ "it¡1)
in which the unobserved country …xed e¤ect is eliminated.
By construction the error term ("it ¡ "it¡1) is correlated with the lagged
dependent in …rst di¤erences [ln(ki;t¡1) ¡ ln(ki;t¡2)]. Hence, instrumental vari-
ables are required to deal with both the potential endogeneity of all the ex-
planatory variables and the bias due to the presence of the lagged dependent
among the regressors. In the Arellano-Bond method, the …rst-di¤erence of the
explanatory variables are instrumented by the lagged values of the explanatory
variables in levels. Under the assumptions that the error term is not serially
27correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous or predeter-
mined (i.e. the explanatory variables are not correlated with future realizations
of the error term), the following moment conditions are applied for the …rst
di¤erence equations:
E [ln(ki;t¡s):("it ¡ "it¡1) ]=0 for s¸ 2; t =3 ;::::;T
E [Xit¡s:("it ¡ "it¡1) ]=0 for s¸ 2; t =3 ;::::;T
The problem with this method is that taking …rst di¤erences of the level
equation, exaplanatory variables which are constant over time cannot be taken
into account. Moreover, as Bond, Hoe­er and Temple (2001) point out, when
time series are persistent, the …rst-di¤erence GMM estimator can behave poorly:
estimates can be seriously biased. To overcome these problems Bond et al.
(2001) suggest to use a more informative set of instruments within the framework
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We use
this new estimator that combines the regression in di¤erences with the regression
in levels in a single system . The instruments used in the …rst di¤erentiated
equation are the same as above, but the instruments for the equation in level
are the lagged di¤erences of the corresponding variables.
For the level equation the following moments condition are to be satis…ed:
E [(ln(ki;t¡s) ¡ ln(ki;t¡s¡1))(´i + ²it)] = 0 for s=1
E [(Xit¡s ¡ Xit¡s¡1)(´i + ²it)] = 0 for s=1
The validity of the instruments can be tested using a Sargan-Hansen overi-
denti…cation test (that is a speci…cation test) and a test on the serial correlation
of the error term (see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995),
Blundell and Bond (1998),Bond, Hoe­er and Temple (2001) )5.
5In our analysis we use the command xtabond2 implemented in STATA. We used the
robust two-step variant. We know that, though asymptotically more e¢cient, the two-step
estimates can be downward biased. But xtabond2 makes available a …nite-sample correction
to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer. STATA guide suggests this variant
for system GMM estimator, because more e¢cient. However, we tried all the regressions using
only the robust one-step variant. The main results of interest did not change very much
28Empirical results. The period of analysis is divided into 4 sub periods of
5 year each (1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, 1995-00). We have 83 countries for a
total of 332 observations in a balanced panel data set. One of the most di¢cult
issue to apply the above dynamic panel technique is to identify the nature of the
explanatory variables (they can be endogenous, exogenous, weakly exogenous
or predetermined6). We tried several speci…cation considering the value of the
Hansen test and the serial correlation test. At the end, we consider the time
dummies and the high income dummy as exogenous variables; all the other
time-varying explanatory variables are considered as predetermined (we used
their one lagged and earlier values as instruments).
Starting from the best cross-section speci…cation (model 4 and 5 in Table
3), Table 6 gives the results of the panel regressions. We have added interac-
tion terms between high income dummy, democracy and trade. Doing this, we
can better understand the di¤erent e¤ects that these two variables can have
according to the di¤erent type of FDI (vertical or horizontal).
6For the exogenous variables they enter as their own instruments in the regressions, two
periods and earlier lagged values of endogenous variables, one period and earlier lagged values
of predetermined or weakly exogenous variables can be used as instruments
29Tab 6. Panel - general speci…cation
Dependent variable = Growth rate of the FDI-funded capital stock per worker
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Initial FDI-funded capital in logs -0,026 -0,032 -0,027 -0,033
(4.04)*** (3.34)*** (3.96)*** (3.08)***
High income dummy -0,309  -  -0,15  - 
(1.22)  -  (0.56)  - 
Initial GDP per capita  in logs  -  0,024  -  0,021
 -  (1.07)  -  (0.75)
Labor force growth rate 0,007 0,064 -0,035 0,005
(0.03) (0.29) (0.15) (0.02)
Total lagged migration stock in logs 0,031 0,025  -   - 
(2.19)** (1.72)*  -   - 
Lagged Share of skilled migrants (0.26) (0.22)  -   - 
(2.32)** (1.97)*  -   - 
Skilled lagged migration stock in logs  -   -  0,029 0,025
 -   -  (2.21)** (1.80)*
Democracy score (lagged) -0,151 -0,156 -0,181 -0,179
(1.93)* (2.04)** (2.18)** (2.27)**
Democracy score (lagged) x High income dummy  0,457 0,181 0,382 0,232
(2.24)** (2.10)** (1.78)* (2.43)**
Lagged trade in logs 0,059 0,05 0,07 0,068
(2.43)** (2.44)** (2.74)*** (2.75)***
Lagged trade in logs x High income dummy 0,004 -0,03 -0,028 -0,046
(0.1) (1.27) (0.68) (1.84)*
d90 0,024 0,027 0,034 0,036
(1.26) (2.12)** (1.98)* (2.65)***
d95 0,06 0,061 0,073 0,076
(2.01)** (2.48)** (2.32)** (2.72)***
d00 0,055 0,063 0,073 0,082
(2.84)*** (3.45)*** (4.02)*** (5.23)***
Constant -0,355 -0,399 -0,216 -0,291
(1.86)* (2.69)*** (1.47) (2.34)**
Observations 332 332 332 332
Number of countries 83 83 83 83
Hansen test- Prob > chi2 0,305 0,512 0,105 0,225
Arelllano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences- Pr > z 0,081 0,083 0,081 0,082
Arelllano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences- Pr > z 0,385 0,413 0,392 0,411
Note: System GMM, Robust two-step; t- statistic in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The main results can be summarized as follows:
Convergence speed. In every speci…cation, the estimated coe¢cient of the
lagged dependent variables is highly signi…cant. We …nd a slower convergence
speed than in the cross section analysis (about 3 percent per year instead of
4 percent). A possible explanation is that OLS estimates are biased upwards
since the lagged dependent variable captures country-speci…c e¤ects. Here it is
instrumented.
Market size, structure of the labour force and attractiveness of the country.
Working on the capital per worker, the size of the market is implictly neutralized
30on the left-hand side. As in the cross-section, the e¤ect of the growth rate of the
labour force is not statistically signi…cant. As we can control for endogeneity,
we use an alternative measure of the market size, the log of GDP per capita: the
coe¢cient associated to that variable is positive but not statistically signi…cant.
This variable is very correlated with the lagged dependent and with interaction
terms (for high income dummy and its interactions with democracy and trade
openness, the correlations respectively amount to 0.7166, 0.7115 and 0.7769)7.
Also the high income dummy alone is not statistically signi…cant and it has not
the right sign; it is very correlated with its interaction terms.
Country openness. The estimated coe¢cient of trade openness is positive
and statistically signi…cant (indicator of vertical FDI and attractiveness of the
country). The interaction with the high income dummy is almost always neg-
ative (indicator of horizontal FDI), but in general not statistically signi…cant.
One of the possible explanations can be that our model better refers to vertical
FDI and captures the exchanges between developed and developing countries.
Political climate. We have two variables that indicates the political climate.
Democracy and its interaction with the high income dummy. The estimated
coe¢cients are in general statistically signi…cant at 5 or 10 percent. The sign
is positive for the interaction term (in general, high income countries are more
democratic) and a negative sign for the overall e¤ect. On the aggregate, stronger
FDI growth rates have been observed in the developing (less democratic) coun-
tries.
Network e¤ects. The estimated coe¢cient of the log of the stock of the
total number of expatriates and of the share of high skilled workers are positive
and statistically signi…cant. The magnitude of the coe¢cient, at least for the
log of the total stock of migrants, is in general higher than in the cross-section
analysis (2.5 to 3 percent, instead of 2 percent). Also the log of the high skilled is
7We prefer the model with the High Income dummy to the model with GDP per capita since
GDP per capita exhibit a strong correlation with other regressors. Hence, standard errors can
be in‡ated. Moreover, the two-step estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions was
singular in model 2. The number of instruments may be large relative to the number of
groups. A generalized inverse must be used to calculate optimal weighting matrix in the
two-step estimation.
31positive and statistically signi…cant. This conforts the results of the cross-section
analysis.
Time dummies. W ei n c l u d ei ne a c hr e g r e s s i o nt h ey e a rt i m ed u m m i e st o
allow for aggregate time e¤ects that have the same in‡uence on the dependent
variable for all countries. Time dummies are positive and in general statistically
signi…cant.
Time stability of diaspora externalities. We added time dummies in
each regression to capture aggregate time e¤ects (a change in the constant over
time) that seem to play an important role in explaining the data. It is worth
investigating whether the magnitude of network externalities has increased over
time. In Table 7, we allow also for interactions between migration stocks and
t h et i m ed u m m i e s 8. We started the analysis considering the general case with
time dummies and interaction terms. Since the time dummies were not sig-
ni…cant (and the interaction terms too), we then ran the regressions without
considering separated time dummies9.In that case, interaction terms become
statistically signi…cant (see both the individual t-statistic and the F-test for the
joint signi…cance). It suggests that the diaspora externality increased in the
nineties.
8Instead of using the lagged value of the interaction terms, we separately use as instruments
the time dummies and the lagged migration stocks (in logs).
9The signi…cance of the interaction variables may simply re‡ect omitted variables and
speci…cation errors, so in this case it can only mean that we don’t have omitted variables and
speci…cation problems and not that the impact on migration on FDI growth has been stable
over time
32T a b7 .P a n e l-S p e c i … c a t i o nw i t ht i m ei n t e r a c t i o nt e r m s
Dependent variable = Growth rate of the FDI-funded capital stock per worker
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Initial FDI-funded capital in logs -0,025 -0,026 -0,027 -0,027
(3.37)*** (3.94)*** (4.03)*** (4.10)***
High income dummy -0,406 -0,343 -0,174 -0,184
(1.56) (1.33) (0.61) (0.71)
Labor force growth rate 0,040 -0,007 0,004 -0,042
(0.17) (0.03) (0.02) (0.18)
Total lagged migration stock in logs 0,026 0,027  -   - 
(1.94)* (2.13)**  -   - 
Lagged Share of skilled migrants 0,221 0,248  -   - 
(1.86)* (2.25)**  -   - 
Total lagged migration stock in logs x d90 -0,003 0,002  -   - 
(0.24) (1.72)*  -   - 
Total lagged migration stock in logs x d95 0,015 0,006  -   - 
(1.5) (2.30)**  -   - 
Total lagged migration stock in logs x d00 0,013 0,005  -   - 
(1.92)* (3.32)***  -   - 
logmighig_1  -   -  0,021 0,023
 -   -  (1.65) (1.85)*
logmighig_190  -   -  -0,001 0,004
 -   -  (0.1) (2.47)**
logmighig_195  -   -  0,017 0,008
 -   -  (1.38) (2.39)**
logmighig_100  -   -  0,012 0,008
 -   -  (1.28) (4.38)***
Democracy score (lagged) -0,131 -0,151 -0,151 -0,182
(1.97)* (2.00)** (2.15)** (2.25)**
DEMHI 0,487 0,476 0,368 0,409
(2.37)** (2.28)** (1.69)* (1.95)*
logtrade_1 0,058 0,059 0,068 0,071
(2.29)** (2.39)** (2.37)** (2.77)***
logtradeHI 0,026 0,01 -0,015 -0,022
(0.61) (0.26) (0.34) (0.55)
d90 0,059  -  0,047  - 
(0.36)  -  (0.32)  - 
d95 -0,110  -  -0,096  - 
(0.97)  -  (0.83)  - 
d00 -0,098  -  -0,048  - 
(1.16)  -  (0.48)  - 
Constant -0,296 -0,316 -0,15 -0,162
(1.68)* (1.74)* (1.04) (1.16)
Observations 332 332 332 332
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 8 38 38 38 3
Hansen test- Prob > chi2 0,379 0,28 0,193 0,075
Arel-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences- Pr > z 0,081 0,079 0,08 0,078
Arel-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences- Pr > z 0,372 0,381 0,375 0,394
Interaction terms (P-value) 0,0103 0,005
Note: System GMM, Robust two-step; t- statistic in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
337C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic empirical model of FDI-funded capital
accumulation. In a cross-section model focusing on the period 1990-2000, our
sample of 114 countries reveals the existence of strong network e¤ects, mainly
associated to the skilled diaspora. These network e¤ects are stronger in demo-
cratic countries as well as in countries exhibiting intermediate corruption index.
Very corrupted regimes face strong di¢culties to attract foreign investments.
In a panel extension with 83 countries and 4 periods of 5 years, we con…rm the
existence of business network externalities. The elasticity of the capital growth
rate to the stock of skilled emigrants is between 2 and 3 percent.
Our empirical analysis con…rms that diaspora externalities constitute an im-
portant channel through which the brain drain positively a¤ect sending coun-
tries. Even when the brain drain depresses the average level of schooling, it
is likely to increase FDI in‡ows. The size of the diaspora matters. Business
externalities are likely to be stronger in large countries. The positive e¤ect of
their diaspora on FDI reinforces the potentially bene…cial e¤ect that migration
prospects induce on human capital formation. On the contrary, small coun-
tries are less likely to bene…t from skilled migration both in terms of human
capital (as demonstrated in the new brain drain literature) and physical capi-
tal. Finally, we show that diaspora externalities are stronger in countries where
corruption is not too high and not too low.
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